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ABTRACT 
 
Considering the considerable dynamics of EU migration policy both at the 
constitutional and legislative level, and the potential constraints for governments to 
pursue certain policies domestically as the result of European integration, more 
attention is merited to explain why and how member governments have managed to 
maintain control over the (legislative) process. This paper analyses how the German 
government remained in charge over the process and safeguarded its key preferences 
with regard to the development and implementation of the “safe third country” concept 
at both at the national and European level. Our paper explores the boundaries and 
interplay between Europeanisation and European integration and thus seeks to 
contribute to the wider Europeanisation debate. We look at the Europeanisation of 
asylum policy, both as a top-down process (domestic change caused by EU level 
developments) and as a bottom up process (whereby Member States transfer their 
policies to the European level in order to avoid costs when “down-loading” European 
policies at a later stage in the process). The latter dimension as well as the interaction 
between the two-levels has so far received insufficient attention in EU/Europeanisation 
research. 
 
The “down-loading” of a security oriented European policy has been a means to 
legitimise reforms of the German constitutional right to asylum. The reform replaced 
the liberal and open asylum system of the post-War era with a restrictive system, 
finding its expression in the institutionalisation of the “safe third country rule”. Since 
Germany was one of the first countries in Europe to overhaul its asylum system it 
became the “pace-setter” in the policy-making process at the EU level. It successfully 
up-loaded/exported its policy reforms of the early1990s to the European level and thus 
avoided high adaptational costs (e.g. another constitutional reform). We thus argue that 
while German asylum policy has been Europeanised at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
recently adopted common asylum standards with regard to the safe third country 
concept have been “Germanised”. We argue that the policy transfer from the EU to the 
domestic and vice versa can be explained by three factors: (1) the discourse, (2) the 
institutional set-up/context, and (3) exogenous and functional pressures. 
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The Europeanisation of German asylum policy and the 
“Germanisation” of European asylum policy:  
the case of the “safe third country” concept 
 
 
Dorothee Post and Arne Niemann 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
EU asylum policy can be regarded as one of the most dynamic areas of European 
integration. At the constitutional level, it has shifted from an intergovernmental 
regime, in which only a handful of Member States participated outside the Treaty 
framework, towards an almost fully communitarised EU policy area in less than 15 
years. On the EU legislative level – even though processes were often cumbersome 
and usually reflected the “minimum standards” stipulated in the Treaty – output in 
quantitative terms has been remarkable.
1 In view of the significant dynamics of EU 
migration policy at both levels and the potential constraints for governments to pursue 
certain policies domestically as the result of European integration, what merits further 
explanation is that member governments often seem to have retained control over the 
process – both at home and in Brussels – and managed to push through their preferred 
policy line. In this paper we seek to substantiate this on the case of Germany with 
regard to the development of the “safe third country concept”
2 within EU/European 
and domestic asylum policy. How can the emergence and development of the concept 
at the domestic level and European level be accounted for? And, how can it be 
explained that the German government – in both uploading and downloading 
Europeanisation processes – stayed in charge and managed to realise its preferences? 
We argue that three, somewhat interrelated, factors can explain this process: (1) the 
discourse, (2) the institutional set-up/context, and (3) exogenous and functional 
pressures. 
                                                 
1    Since 1999 the Council has adopted on average each month ten new texts on JHA issues, many of 
which on asylum policy. Monar 2004, 4. 
2   According to the safe third country rule, “an asylum seeker is denied access to substantive 
refugee determination procedures, on the ground that he could or should have requested and if 
qualified, would actually have been granted refugee protection in another country.” Kjaergaard 
1994, 652.  
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Our paper is the linked to the (wider) debate on whether Europeanisation restricts 
or enhances Member governments’ scope for manoeuvre.
3 However, our paper goes 
beyond the still predominating focus on top-down processes, by including bottom-up 
processes in our analysis, as well as feedback processes from both levels. From an 
empirical perspective our paper also provides insights for explaining Germany’s 
transformation from “vanguard to laggard”
4 in EU asylum policy.  
We proceed as follows: section two defines key concepts and explicates the 
framework for analysing our empirical data. Section three analyses the 
Europeanisation of German asylum policy leading to a change of the German Basic 
Law. Section four considers how and why Germany managed to export its safe third 
country concept to the European level, i.e. we look at the Germanisation of EU asylum 
policy. Finally, we draw some conclusions. 
 
 
2. CONCEPT AND FRAMEWORK 
 
Our analytical framework is made up of three factors: (1) the discourse, (2) the 
institutional set-up/context, and (3) exogenous and functional pressures. The 
framework is not meant to constitute a full-fledged theory. It rather comprises building 
blocks that may be used for more formal theorising. The explanatory factors of the 
framework have been derived inductively from prior research (Post and Niemann 
2005, Post 2004). The subsequent factors are intertwined in several ways and cannot 
always be neatly separated from each other.  
 
The discourse 
 
Discourses have been described as institutions (here broadly defined) in their own 
right that shape actors’ “boundaries of the possible”
5 and “guide political action by 
denoting appropriate or plausible behaviour in light of an agreed environment.”
6 
Discourse analysis points to the existence of hegemonic conceptions, elements which 
have acquired the status of knowledge for which reason they are located largely 
                                                 
3   Cf. e.g. Lavenex 1999, Thielemann 2002. 
4   Hellmann et al. 2005. 
5   Jachtenfuchs 1997, 47. 
6   Rosamond 2000, 120.  
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outside the realm of the contestable. Language here constitutes the central element 
through which the dominant (policy) frames
7 are generated. 
It has been noted that “discourses do not exist ‘out there’ in the world; rather, they 
are structures that are actualized in their regular use by people of discursively ordered 
relationships”.
8 The terms assigned to specific issues concentrate the attention on 
certain elements and lead to the neglect of others. Through the selection of certain 
words over others frameworks of meanings are established. Put differently, “discursive 
interventions contribute towards establishing a particular structure of meaning-in-use 
which works as a cognitive roadmap […].” Such structures create pressure for 
adaptation on all actors involved.
9 In this analysis, the study of discursive interventions 
has taken place through an investigation of official documents, (especially 
parliamentary) debates, speeches and major media. 
 
Institutional composition/context 
 
The institutional context enables or facilitates the appearance of certain actors and 
(thus also) discourses, while excluding or hampering others. This may happen, as the 
institutional composition tends to reinforce the position of a particular advocacy 
coalition (to the detriment of another group), thereby fostering the implementation of 
its promoted policy.
10 In other words, the institutional structure shapes the access of 
actors (and thus discourses) to the decision-making arena, which in turn favours the 
development of certain policy lines or ‘cognitive roadmaps’ over others. On the 
EU/European level, the degree of involvement of supranational institutions and the 
type of decision rules (e.g. qualified majority voting or unanimity) may have an 
important impact on policy outcomes, as the agenda-setting powers of different actors 
as well as veto points are thus established. At the domestic (here German) level, the 
division of powers of certain groups of actors, such as the Chancellery (Kanzleramt), 
the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) and the Ministry of the Interior 
(Bundesministerium des Inneren), and among the various political parties, constitutes 
an important element of the institutional composition. 
                                                 
7   “A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be 
made sense and acted upon.” Policy frames are shared understandings concerning a given issue, 
which reflect actors‘ perceptions and definitions of the issue (Rein and Schön 1991, 264).  
8   Milliken 1999, 231. 
9   Wiener 2004, 201. 
10   Cf. Lavenex 2001b, 855-856.  
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Another feature of the institutional context is the potential for two-level games. 
These may be played when domestic and international politics are entangled.
11 The 
insight of the “two-level” metaphor is that governments, acting in the domestic and 
international arenas simultaneously, have to conciliate domestic demands with 
international pressures. In doing so, governments can act as gate-keepers between the 
two levels. One of the key insights from two-level games is that in international 
negotiations (national) policy-makers can refer to domestic constraints in order to 
strengthen their negotiating position at the international level. The negotiating power 
depends on the size of domestic-level “win-sets”, i.e. the set of all possible 
international-level agreements that would win sufficient domestic support in order to 
be viable. The smaller the domestic win-set, the larger the negotiating power at the 
international level.
12 Furthermore, two-level games can be played the other way round: 
national policy-makers can draw on the international level (or European level for that 
matter) in order to bring about policy changes in the domestic arena, which they would 
not have been able to produce without indirect ‘support’ or legitimacy from constraints 
at the international level. Constraints or necessities at either level may be purposely 
carried into the discourse arena (where it may also be exaggerated or, to some extent, 
strategically constructed) in order to increase one’s own bargaining space/power on 
the respective other level. By advancing the need for action through two-level 
“strategic gaming” actors may induce the resonance with a particular policy discourse. 
 
Functional and exogenous pressures 
 
Our third explanatory cluster is made up of pressures/tensions in the ‘real’ (material) 
world that can be distinguished from the institutional set-up/context. Functional 
pressures come about when an original goal can be assured only by taking further 
(integrative) actions.
13 The basis for the development of functional pressures is the 
interdependence of issues (or policy sectors). As regards European integration, 
functional interdependence means that individual sectors and issues tend to be so 
interdependent in modern polities and economies that it is likely to be difficult to 
isolate them from the rest.
14 (Endogenous-)functional pressures thus encompass the 
tensions, contradictions and interdependencies arising from within (or which are 
closely related to) the European integration project and its policies, politics and polity, 
                                                 
11   On two-level games see Putnam 1988. For use of this concept in EU studies see, for example, 
Moravcsik 1993. 
12   Putnam 1988, 440. 
13   Cf. Lindberg 1963, 10.  
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which induce policy-makers to take additional cooperative/integrative steps in order to 
achieve their original objectives. In the context of (EU) migration policy the “free 
movement of persons” principle constitutes an important functional pressure. It is 
closely linked to the idea of abolishing border controls at the EC’s internal frontiers.
15 
This objective sets in motion certain functional pressures as the original goal could 
only be achieved by taking a number of compensatory measures, for instance, 
concerning asylum policy, as the possibility of “asylum-shopping” posed a more 
serious problem in a borderless Europe. The subsequent Schengen and Dublin 
Convention(s), in turn, activated new functional pressures, as they arguably affected – 
to varying extends – national practices and legislations. 
Exogenous pressures encompass those factors that originate outside the integration 
process itself, i.e. that are exogenous to it. They affect the behaviour of national and 
supranational actors and also influence EU and domestic structures. In the European 
context of asylum policy exogenous pressures constitute large numbers of asylum-
seekers and refugees entering the Community and staying there, legally or illegally.
16 
This, combined with socio-economic problems in Western Europe – especially rising 
levels of unemployment – resulted in the perceived need to limit the number of third 
country nationals seeking asylum in the Community. In addition, as several Member 
States began to introduce more restrictive national legislations, other Member States 
were, to some extent, pressured to follow suit, as the gradual abolition of internal 
Community/Schengen borders threatened to increase the migratory burden for those 
countries with relatively liberal asylum legislations. Moreover, the pressure was on for 
a common European solution as the nature of the (migration) ‘problem’ went beyond 
the governance potential of individual states, not least due to the ‘free movement of 
persons’ principle and the restrictive competitive policy-making across Western 
Europe.
17 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 also constitute an important 
exogenous pressure. 
Functional and exogenous pressures − similar to the institutional set-up − provide 
the (physical) background that helps to enable certain discourses. It is assumed here 
that discourses are embedded in ‘reality’ in the sense of actions, materiality and 
institutions.
18 We thus (also) imply that ‘discursive’ structures resonate particularly 
well, when they are supported by ‘material’ structures. On the other hand, we also 
                                                                                                                                                         
14   Cf. Haas 1958, 297, 383. 
15   E.g. Niemann forthcoming 2008. 
16   Cf. Collinson 1993; Butt Philip 1994. 
17   See Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994, 11; Achermann 1995. 
18     Cf. Wæver 2004, 199.  
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acknowledge that functional and exogenous pressures, to some extent, only represent 
pressures and constraints, when actors perceive them as such. In addition, we suggest 
that these pressures can be strategically instrumentalised in order to raise the 
legitimacy of actions and discursive arguments.
19 
 
 
The concept of Europeanisation
20 
 
Research on Europeanisation has gradually increased since the mid-1990s and has 
developed into an academic growth industry over the last decade. The term 
Europeanisation has been used in a number of different ways to describe a variety of 
phenomena and processes of change.
21 Most frequently Europeanisation is referred to 
as domestic change, in terms of policy substance and instruments, processes and 
politics as well as polity caused by European integration.
22 Existing policies (in 
integrated sectors) are increasingly made at the European level, which leads to 
substantial changes in the policy fabric (and content) of EU member states.
23  
As a field of inquiry, Europeanisation merits continued systematic academic 
attention, for several reasons. First, the Europeanisation research agenda arguably 
focuses on a set of very important research questions, related to where, how, why, and 
to what extent domestic change occurs as a consequence of EU integration and 
governance at the European level. Second, compared to several decades that European 
integration studies have focused on explaining and describing the emergence and 
development of a supranational system of European cooperation, research on 
Europeanisation is still in its infancy. Third, it is difficult to make firm cause-and-
effect generalisations in this field of inquiry, given, for example, the considerable 
variation in national institutional histories, actor constellations, and structural 
differentiation as well as the complex interplay between mechanisms of change at both 
the domestic and European levels.
24 
As a starting point, Europeanisation is understood here as the process of change in 
the domestic arena resulting from the European level of governance. However, 
Europeanisation is not viewed as a unidirectional but as a two-way-process, which 
develops both top-down and bottom-up. Top-down perspectives largely emphasise 
                                                 
19     This is reminiscent of Schimmelfenning’s (2001) rhetorical action. 
20   This section heavily draws on Brand and Niemann 2005. 
21   Cf. Olsen 2002. 
22   Cf. e.g. Radaelli 2000, 3; Ladrech 1994, 69. 
23   See e.g. Caporaso and Jupille 2001. 
24   Cf. Olsen 2002, 933ff.  
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vertical developments from the European to the domestic level.
25 Bottom-up accounts 
stress the national influence concerning European-level developments (which in turn 
feeds back into the domestic realm). This perspective highlights that Member States 
are more than passive receivers of European-level pressures. They may shape policies 
and institutions on the European level to which they have to adjust at a later stage.
26 
By referring to Europeanisation as a two-way process our conceptualisation underlines 
the interdependence between the European and domestic levels for an explanation of 
such processes. In contrast to a unidirectional top-down usage of the concept, studying 
Europeanisation as a two-way process entails certain disadvantages in terms of 
(waning) conceptual parsimony and methodological straightforwardness. However, we 
argue that these problems are outweighed by a substantially greater ability to capture 
important empirical phenomena. It has suggested, for example, that Member States´ 
responses to Europeanisation processes feed back into the European level of decision-
making. European/EU policies, institutions and processes cannot be taken as given, but 
are, at least to some extent, the result of domestic political preferences and processes 
which are acted out on the European level.
27 
It should be pointed out that for us Europeanisation does not equate “EUisation”. 
Rather the EU is only part – albeit an important one – of the wider fabric of cross-
border regimes in Europe in which other (transnational) institutions and frameworks, 
both formal and informal, also play a role. Hence the EU is not the monopoly source 
and channel of Europeanisation.
28 This may include institutional arrangements at the 
European level which are related to European (integration and) cooperation in a 
broader sense, such as the Schengen Agreement, the Council of Europe (COE) or the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
29 
While working with a fairly wide notion of Europeanisation, it is important to 
clearly delimit the concept in order to avoid the danger of overstretching it. For 
example, we would reject “the emergence and development at the European level of 
distinct structures of governance” as an appropriate definition of Europeanisation.
30 
Closely related, Europeanisation as conceived of here is to be distinguished from 
                                                 
25   Cf. e.g. Ladrech 1994, Schmidt 2002. 
26   Börzel 2002. 
27   Cf. e.g. Börzel 2002; Dyson 1999. 
28   Wallace 2000, esp. 371, 376. 
29   By not restricting Europeanisation to change induced by the EU, it is possible to escape the n = 1 
dilemma in European integration studies where the EU is only an instance of itself, as a result of 
which findings cannot be generalised because of this uniqueness (cf. e.g. Rosamond 2000, 17). 
EU Europeanisation processes can thus be compared with larger/other Europeanisation processes 
in Europe and with other cases of regional integration (also cf. Vink 2002, 6-7). 
30   Cf. Risse et al. 2001, 3; emphasis added.  
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“political unification of Europe”.
31 Although above we have pointed out that our 
conceptualisation relates to interaction with the European integration process and to 
changes on the European/EU level, the core focus remains on the process of change in 
the domestic arena.
32 In addition, Europeanisation should not be confused with 
“harmonisation” and also differs from “convergence”. Europeanisation may lead to 
harmonisation and convergence, but this is not necessarily the case. Empirical findings 
indicate that Europeanisation may have a differential impact on national policy-
making and that it leaves considerable margin for domestic diversities.
33 Moreover, 
there is a difference between a process (Europeanisation) and its consequences (e.g. 
potential harmonisation and convergence).
34  
 
 
3. THE EUROPEANISATION OF ASYLUM POLICY IN GERMANY: THE 
1993 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS  
 
By the early/mid 1990s ─ at which point our analysis of (domestic) asylum policy 
begins  ─ migration policy (at the European level) can be characterised by 
securitisation and intergovernmentalism. Both the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration and 
the Schengen Group left national governments and administrations in control of the 
policy-making process, given the very minimal interference of supranational 
institutions, Member States authority over agenda-setting and above all the national 
veto. The third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty somewhat augmented the role of 
supranational institutions but left the unanimity requirement largely untouched. 
Characteristic of all these institutional set-ups was that they provided law-and-order 
officials with a prominent role in the policy-making process. Their dominance, the 
propensity towards lowest-common denominator agreements due to the unanimity 
requirement as well as the growing politicisation of migration and the linkage between 
migration and internal security facilitated the emergence of a security continuum, in 
which migration was merged with cross-border criminality, such as drug trafficking 
                                                 
31   Olsen 2002, 940. 
32   As pointed out by Vink (2002, 6) it is rather questionable to add a new concept (Europeanisation) 
as a synonym for notions such as European integration or communitarisation (also cf. Radaelli 
2000, 3). 
33   Cf. Héritier et al. 2001; Caporaso and Jupille 2001. 
34   Radaelli 2000, 5.  
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and terrorism. At the same time the discourse framed asylum increasingly as a 
question of economic, social and cultural (in)security.
35 
The security continuum was reflected in the Schengen Convention, Dublin 
Convention and London Resolutions. These instruments were regarded to be necessary 
compensatory measures in light of the abolition of internal borders. They aimed at the 
establishment of a burden sharing system, which would enable Member States to 
regain control over refugees, for example by determining that the first entry state had 
to deal with asylum applications. The London Resolutions
36 were an attempt to define 
some minimum standards with regard to the processing of asylum claims, including 
the application of the safe third country concept. They set forth that asylum claims by 
applicants entering from a safe third country, designated by the Member State on a 
case-by case basis, were to be considered under accelerated procedures, excluding an 
examination of the merits of the case. Hence, the Resolution limited the access of 
asylum seekers to status determination procedures and to the territory, thus questioning 
the principle of non-refoulement.
37 Moreover, the Resolution caused an externalisation 
of responsibility for asylum claims to countries outside the EU, in particular its eastern 
neighbours.
38 Although they were legally non-binding, the resolutions contributed to 
the increasing securitisation of the normative framework. They served as instruments 
to legitimise restrictive reforms in the Member States, in particular in the Netherlands 
and Germany, without however harmonizing substantial or procedural standards.
39  
The notion of asylum has been closely tied to the self-understanding of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The subjective right to asylum stipulated in the old Article 16 
(2) 2 Basic Law was understood by the founders of the Federal Republic as a 
“continuous humanitarian” duty of Germany towards persecuted people regardless of 
short-sighted political considerations.
40 It was a reaction by the political elite to the 
experience of National Socialism and the Holocaust. The notion of asylum was 
therefore embedded in the broader ideational context of the “new” German State based 
on a humanitarian orientation and the notion of the rule of law. This humanitarian 
orientation was upheld, above all, by the support of Social Democrats (SPD) and 
                                                 
35   This development towards a security continuum has been described for example by Bigo 1996, 
Huysmans 2000, Lavenex 2001a, Post and Niemann 2005. 
36   There were three resolutions (Council 1992a; Council 1992b; Council 1992c). For this context, 
the resolution on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third countries is the most 
relevant. When referring to the London Resolutions, we particularly refer to that one (Council 
1992c). 
37   See Kjaergaard 1994, 653-654. 
38   See Lavenex 2001a, 114. 
39   See Schwarze 2001, 211; Uçarer 2002, 25. 
40   Ernst Benda, cited in Lavenex 2001a, 36.  
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Liberals (FDP). Conservatives (CDU), on the other hand, increasingly argued in 
favour of more restrictive asylum laws and amending Article 16 of the Basic Law.
41 
The 1993 reform of the Basic Law marked a watershed in that it brought about a 
substantially more restrictive domestic asylum regime. Even though Article 16 a (1) 
GG still guarantees that “persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right 
to asylum”, it has been extended by a long list of specifications and restrictions, 
changing the character of its wording from the style of a constitutional right into an 
administrative regulation.
42 According to Article 16 a (2) I GG, a person entering 
Germany from “a Member State of the European Union” may not invoke Article 16 
(1) GG. Hence, Germany can send a refugee back to another Member State unless it is 
itself responsible for examining the application.
43 The clause goes beyond the 
objective to establish a burden-sharing system among the Member States of the 
European Union but also extends it to non-member states.
44 
Although the German government partly justified the implementation of the safe 
third country concept in the Basic Law with the necessity to comply with European 
standards, the German application of the safe third country concept differed from the 
standards set out by the London Resolutions. Contrary to that resolution, the German 
Basic Law does not provide for an individual assessment of the safety of a country, but 
allows for the general presumption of countries being safe. Germany thus exceeded the 
standards set out by the London Resolution.
45 Moreover, according to Article 16 (2) in 
connection with § 18 (2) (2) Asylum Procedure Act, a refugee entering from a 
designated third country can automatically be sent back by the border authorities, even 
if he or she merely travelled through the country. Such a border procedure also goes 
beyond the standards set forth in the London Resolutions and has become a “hallmark” 
of Germany’s restrictive asylum praxis. 
How can the constitutional amendments be explained? Particularly how can this 
reform, which required a 2/3 majority in the Bundestag, be explained in face of 
Germany’s (hitherto) liberal asylum tradition and the support for this humanitarian 
orientation by Liberals and Social Democrats in (up to) the early 1990s?  In addition, 
legally speaking neither the Dublin Convention nor the Schengen Convention 
necessitated a constitutional change.
46 We argue that (1) functional and exogenous 
                                                 
41   Cf. Münch 1993, Schwarze 2001. 
42   Bosswick 2000, 50. 
43   § 18 (3) Asylum Procedure Act. 
44   Davy 2001, 38. 
45   Para. 2 (a) RSTC. 
46   Huber 1989, 59; Kröning 1989, 101; Kimminich 1989, 301.  
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factors; (2) the institutional set-up/context and (3) the discourse can explain this 
change. 
 
 
Functional and exogenous pressures 
 
By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Germany experienced a major 
flow of migration including asylum seekers
47, refugees from the civil war zones of 
post-communist countries, and ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union, Poland and 
Romania. Altogether, about three million migrants arrived in Germany between 1989 
and 1992.
48 These developments put an immense strain on public funds and challenged 
the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic.
49 Parts of the population felt 
overburdened by this number of immigrants, causing public resentment against 
foreigners
50 and increased frustration with the German political elite that was unable to 
solve the problem, making xenophobia socially more acceptable.
51 There were violent 
attacks by neo-Nazis on asylum centres marking the beginning of the worst wave of 
xenophobic violence Germany had seen since the end of the Third Reich. 
Conservatives linked these xenophobic incidents to the rising number of asylum 
seekers. Hence, even though opposing the violent outbreaks, politicians accepted the 
definition of the problem as one of internal stability and security and thus legitimated 
the violence.
52 By the end of the 1980s the immigration problem was magnified to 
become the leading political issue in public debates, thus creating an “institutionalized 
phobia”.
53 
An increased number of migrants and an institutionalised phobia have to be seen in 
the context of free movement of persons principle and the policy response in other EC 
Member States. The adoption of the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of 
controls at the common frontiers by five Member States in 1985, and the Single 
European Act of 1986, aiming for the realisation of an internal market by the end of 
1992, reinforced the free movement of persons objective.
54 As other EC Member 
                                                 
47   1989: 120,610 asylum applications; 1990: 148,842; 1991: 168,023 asylum applications; 1992: 
216,356 asylum applications; 1993: 512,561 asylum applications. See Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, at http://www.bafl.de/template/asylstatistik/content_entscheidungen_teil1.htm. 
48   Joppke points out that this number was “no small thing for a country that defines itself as not an 
immigration country.” See Joppke 1998, 127. 
49   See Joppke 1998, 128. 
50   Becker 1993, 141-150. 
51   See Bade 1994, 117. 
52   See Neuman 1993, 525; Bade 1994, 126. 
53   Bielefeld 1993, 37. 
54   Niemann 2006.  
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States had introduced more restrictive asylum provisions in their national legislations 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, it was foreseeable that in a borderless Europe those 
countries with more liberal asylum regimes (such as Germany until 1993) would have 
to take much of the burden.
55 In addition, the Dublin Convention, which sought to 
tackle “asylum-shopping” by determining that the first entry state had to deal with 
asylum applications, seemed for some to be difficult to reconcile with the 
constitutional right to asylum in Germany. This combination of functional and 
exogenous policy structures put pressure on Germany to change its asylum law.  
However, three qualifications have to be made, which call into doubt the “need” for 
a constitutional change in Germany. First, it can be argued that the free movement of 
persons logic (and its implications for asylum matters) has its limitations, as (a) 
borders have always been more permeable and more difficult to police than usually 
suggested and (b) personal identity controls increased in the wake of the abolition of 
internal borders.
56 Secondly, European level provisions, especially the Dublin 
Convention and the Schengen II Convention that were already signed (but not yet 
ratified), as well as the London Resolutions, alleviated the “problem”, for example, by 
introducing the safe third country concept and by making provisions for burden-
sharing. Thirdly, legally speaking, neither the Dublin Convention nor the Schengen 
Convention required a constitutional change.
57 Both conventions included an opt-out 
clause that would have allowed to maintain the subjective right to asylum, and to 
review asylum claims already rejected in another Member State. Although they 
already constituted a certain rationale for a change of German legislation, functional 
and exogenous pressures cannot by themselves convincingly explain why the reform 
of Article 16 GG came about.  
 
 
The institutional context/composition 
 
Since migration is a very multidisciplinary topic, different ministries as well as 
Germany’s Chancellery competed for power in that policy field.
58 The organisational 
structure of the integration process led to a redistribution of power as Germany’s 
Ministry of the Interior was able to enhance its position vis-à-vis the other ministries. 
While European integration in the field of migration was first determined by the 
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Federal Chancellery, which negotiated the Schengen Agreement in 1985 in 
cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office, there was a gradual shift of influence 
towards the Federal Ministry of the Interior.
59 This was due to the fact that civil 
servants of this ministry, in particular of the police department in the ministry, became 
more and more involved in the negotiations at the working group level. The 
transgovernmental policy-making process at the EU level provided ministers and civil 
servants with the possibility to draft instruments reflecting their own domestic asylum 
agendas behind closed doors.
60 They were then able to utilise these instruments as a 
tool for advancing their position in domestic political forums and to link their own 
agenda of internal security (and restrictive migration policy) with the moves towards 
an abolition of the internal borders. The various ministers of the interior 
(Zimmermann, Schäuble, Seiters) subsequently called for the restriction of the 
constitutional right to asylum as the precondition of harmonisation of asylum policy. 
They took on the role of policy advocacies in the domestic arena in their attempt to 
persuade other actors involved in the policy discourse by using membership in the EU 
as an alibi for justifying restrictive measures to the parliament and the public. 
This leads us to the second element of the institutional composition, that of two-
level games. Moravcsik drawing on Putnam has demonstrated that policy-makers can 
draw on the European level to bring about policy changes in the domestic arena, which 
they would not have been able to produce without indirect support and legitimacy 
from the European level.
61 Such behaviour can be attributed to officials from the 
German Ministry of the Interior.
62 More prominently, CDU/CSU politicians managed 
to advance their policy objective by repeatedly referring to the ‘inherent necessities’ 
stemming from the EU level. By making reference to the European level they could 
add legitimacy to their privately held preference for a constitutional change of German 
asylum law. CDU/CSU politicians played a number of variations of the two-level 
game: (1) by linking the discussion concerning the Schengen II ratification to a 
CDU/CSU motion for a reform of Article 16 GG
63, they argued that the ratification of 
Schengen is only possible after Germany changed Article 16 of its Basic Law
64; (2) 
after it was exposed in the Bundestag debate that this was legally untrue, it was held 
that without changing the Grundgesetz, Germany would only be a ‘limping 
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participant’ in the Schengen regime, able to fulfil its duties, but unable to make use of 
its rights (of transferring asylum claims to other countries)
 65; (3) going one step up on 
the two-level game bargaining ladder, the head of the CDU parliamentary group, 
Schäuble, threatened to advice the CDU parliamentary group not to ratify Schengen II, 
unless Article 16 GG was ‘supplemented’
66; (4) most frequently it was (unspecifically) 
argued that changing the Basic Law would enable Germany to take part in the future 
development and harmonisation of EU asylum policy. This line was particularly 
intensified when some (Social Democrat and Liberal) MPs further questioned the 
relevance of Schengen for the issue of reforming Article 16 GG
67. The above also 
indicates the most of these two-level games were played strategically in the sense that 
claims and implications of European-level developments were opportunistically 
exaggerated. In any case, by playing the “European card” the CDU/CSU managed to 
influence decisively the German political discourse. 
 
 
The discourse 
 
By analyzing the development of the discourse we attain a more complete 
understanding of the policy transformation in Germany. The two-level game described 
above strongly contributed to the empowerment of a certain discourse. Framing the 
restrictive reforms as a requirement for Germany’s participation in a European asylum 
policy (and to a lesser extent as a precondition for realising the abolition of internal 
borders) resonated well with the strong normative appeal of European integration 
across all German political parties. In addition, the securitarian policy frame adopted at 
the European level resonated well with the policy discourse at the domestic level. This 
facilitated the redefinition of the “problem” to be a European, and not a domestic one. 
By getting legitimacy from pursuing domestic policy in the name of European 
integration, the dictum of a constitutional change as means for enabling a European 
asylum policy became the hegemonic conception. Subsequently, this gradually 
developed into the dominant discourse on asylum among the German political elites. 
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Politicians favouring the reform
68 referred, above all, to the need for a common 
European asylum approach, requiring Germany to bring its asylum legislation in line 
with a more restrictive approach taken by most of its European partners and at the 
European level.
69  Even a number of Social Democrats and Liberals began to carry this 
discourse. Gerhard Schröder (SPD), for example, stated that, “we want [further] 
European integration, in good times and in bad times. Hence, we need European 
asylum [legislation] because refugee streams are a European problem. […] For this 
reason – and only for this reason – do we want to supplement the Basic Law. […]“.
70 
For the SPD and FDP European integration provided a means for legitimising their 
agreement to a constitutional reform to their electorate.
71 The legitimizing effect of 
European integration is also reflected in the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court 
of 14 May 1996. In its reasoning, the Court repeatedly pointed to the establishment of 
a European burden-sharing system and justified the reform as the basis for a European 
asylum policy.
72 
In addition to legitimising the ‘pro-constitutional reform’ discourse by tapping to 
the strong appeal of European integration, this discourse was further cemented by 
drawing on the securitarian approach inherent in European instruments, which 
corresponded with fears of increased numbers of bogus asylum seekers that have been 
part of the long-lasting asylum discourse in Germany. The participation of Germany in 
the burden-sharing system of the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Convention 
was defined as an indispensable means to guarantee Germany’s internal security in a 
borderless Europe. The reform of the German asylum regime was framed as a 
precondition for participation in a common European asylum system and thus as a 
condition for its internal security.
73 Furthermore, the characterisation of Germany 
turning into the Asylreserveland
74 of Europe complemented the discourse and led to 
growing support for downgrading German standards to lower European ones.  
The European argument had been used by Conservative politicians since the mid-
1980s.
75 But why did the policy change only occur in 1992/93? This can be explained 
fourfold. Firstly, discursive structures generally need a certain time to develop. When 
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tracing the discourse in the German Bundestag, it is notable that speeches/statements 
underlining the necessity to change the Grundgesetz for coming in line with European 
initiatives became more frequent over time while the liberal argument concerning 
Germany’s continuous humanitarian duty became less pronounced. Secondly, in 1992 
the CDU/CSU parliamentary group explicitly linked the ratification of the Schengen II 
Convention to the change of Article 16 GG and thus pronounced the ‘European card’ 
in the discourse (even) more severely. Thirdly, since the 1980s the free movement of 
persons argument and its (alleged) impact on EU and domestic policy-making 
gradually gained currency, until it almost acquired the status of knowledge outside the 
realm of the contestable in the early to mid 1990s.
76 As a result, the discourse linking 
the free movement of persons principle to domestic internal security problems in terms 
of migration also became more forceful. Finally, discursive structures resonate 
particularly well, when they are supported by “material” structures that can be pointed 
to. In this case, the exogenous pressure in terms of rising numbers of asylum seekers 
until 1993 reinforced the (prevailing) discourse concerning the danger of turning into 
the Asylreserveland of Europe.  
 
 
4. THE “GERMANISATION” OF EU ASYLUM POLICY: THE 
NEGOTIATIONS OF THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam set forth that within a period of 5 years binding minimum 
standards on the reception of asylum seekers, a common refugee definition, asylum 
procedures as well as criteria and mechanisms for a burden sharing system were to be 
adopted by the Member States.
77 Hence, the integration process became more 
hierarchical and non-voluntary than under the Maastricht regime. Nevertheless the 
institutional structure remained “hybrid”
78, reflecting the continuous tension between 
state sovereignty and European integration. Although the supranational institutions 
were granted additional powers, the Council and hence the Member States remained 
more influential than in other policy areas. For example, during the transnational 
period of five years, the Council retained a shared right of initiative and unanimity 
which remained the general rule in the Council. Moreover, the European Parliament 
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was merely to be consulted on matters of asylum policy. Decision-making in the 
Council and the role of the EP remained largely unchanged during the 2000 IGC. 
Concerning Article 63 (1) (measures on asylum) a switch to qualified majority voting 
and co-decision was made conditional  on prior unanimous adoption of legislation 
defining common rules and basic principles. Hence, a switch was postponed until after 
adoption of the respective directives, which were in progress (including the procedure 
directive). Thus, the Member States remained the dominant actors during the 
negotiations on the asylum directives.  
Our analysis of the safe third country rule focuses on the asylum procedure 
directive, which laid down the concept. Yet, the analysis considers the directive as 
well as the safe third country concept within the context of a comprehensive asylum 
approach.
79  
 
Exogenous and functional pressures: illegal immigration, the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, the right-wing election victories and EU enlargement 
 
When analyzing the development of European asylum policy in general, and the 
directive on asylum procedure in particular, several exogenous factors have to be taken 
into consideration. Although these events were not always directly linked to the 
negotiations of the asylum directives at the EU level, they shaped their context and 
constituted the material structures within which the public discourse was framed.  
When in 2000, 58 illegal immigrants were found dead in a Dutch truck in Dover, 
there was a public outcry, followed by demands for a more effective policy against 
illegal immigration.
80 At the same time, the media and right-wing parties were 
accusing illegal immigrants to abuse the asylum systems as well as social security 
systems.
81 After further refugee tragedies, especially in the Mediterranean Sea, 
Southern European countries demanded a system for ensuring a fairer burden 
sharing.
82 Consequently, there was growing public pressure to find agreement on a 
common European immigration policy, including common asylum standards, which 
were seen to be important measures to develop a genuine system of burden-sharing as 
well as to deter illegal immigrants from abusing European refugee systems.
83 
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In addition, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 lifted internal security matters to the top of 
the agenda of every Member State. As the attacks were carried out by foreign 
nationals, the measures taken in the wake of the attacks and the public discourse (see 
below) focused on the tightening of border controls and immigration rules. While the 
attacks had no direct effect on the negotiations on asylum policy they, however, 
strengthened the link between internal security and migration.  
Following the debate on illegal immigration as well as the terrorist attacks, right-
wing parties were gaining public support. Most notable were the success of the French 
right-wing populist, Le Pen in the Presidential Elections of 2002, and the success of 
the Dutch populist, Pim Fortuyn. Both gained votes due to a racist and islamophobic 
rhetoric and by accusing their governments of being unable to curb illegal immigration 
and the abuse of asylum.
84 Although neither of the two politicians got into power, they 
pressured their governments to take more restrictive measures both at the national as 
well as EU level.
85  
Moreover, Member States still felt the “negative” implications of the gradual 
implementation of the free movement principle. The burden-sharing system that had 
been established by the Dublin Convention was working insufficiently, partly because 
of substantial differences between refugee laws and procedural standards in the 
Member States. The primary aim of the minimum standards was hence to “limit 
secondary movements influenced solely by the diversity of applicable rules.” 
Harmonisation of conditions was regarded to be necessary to “avoid negative effects 
for the Member States’ interests.”
86 
Lastly, Member States were eager to find an agreement on a general framework for 
a common asylum policy before the enlargement of the EU in May 2004. Since it was 
already difficult to agree among 15 Member States on minimum standards, the 
Member States were concerned that an agreement among 25 States would be 
impossible. Moreover, Eastern European states which were constituting the Eastern 
external borders of the Union, were thought to have substantially different interests 
than the EU-15.
87  
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The discourse: between liberal economic migration and global terrorism 
The European discourse: The Tampere Conclusions and the fight against terrorism 
 
At the turn of the century, a discursive change towards a less security oriented 
discourse and a more liberal approach to the issue of migration as well as a common 
asylum policy at the European level seemed likely. Most notable, the Tampere 
Conclusions which are considered to be a milestone in the development of a common 
EU asylum and immigration policy, underlined the “commitment to freedom based on 
human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law” and envisioned the 
establishment of an “open and secure European Union, fully committed to the 
obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention, and other relevant human rights 
instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity.
88 At 
the same time, there were efforts by the Commission as well as some Member States 
to pursue a more liberal policy on labour immigration due to a growing shortage of 
skilled and unskilled labour and an aging population.
89  
These liberal discourses were, however, flanked by a discourse that further 
criminalised both illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. As has been noted above, the 
increasing number of refugee tragedies especially when crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea as well as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted a right-wing and racist discourse 
in different European countries. In Great Britain, for example, the yellow press 
complained that illegal migrants enrich themselves at the expense of the British 
people.
90 At the European level the aim of a common immigration and asylum policy 
was reformulated: to strike a “balance” between on the one hand the commitment to 
international Conventions, principally the Geneva Convention, and on the other hand 
the need for “resolute action to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human 
beings”.
91  
Following the 9/11 attacks, migration as a cross-border phenomenon became 
embedded in a broader discourse in which the systemic referent object was no longer 
the security of the state, internally and externally but emerging “standards of 
civilization”
92 such as democracy, freedom and the rule of law. The European Council 
defined the attacks “as an assault on our open democratic, tolerant and multicultural 
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societies. They are a challenge to the conscience of each human being”.
93 While the 
earlier discourses had constructed an us-them logic, identifying the other as an 
existential threat to the cultural homogeneity of the national community, the migrant 
was now framed as a “political threat”, attacking the democratic standards of Western 
societies. Consequently, the discourse strengthened the link between trust within the 
political community, and fear of the “other”, the foreigner, who is in the case of 
terrorism the “carrier of death”
94, and thus a physical threat. Even though the European 
leaders explicitly rejected any “equation of fanatic terrorists with the Arab and Muslim 
World”
95, it can be argued that by engaging in the meta-politics of migration and 
security, “politicians produce the very ‘clash of civilization’ from which they verbally 
abstain.”
96 
Moreover, the post-9/11 discourse drew a clear link between terrorism and 
migration by arguing that “terrorism is, because of its cross-border dimension, a 
migration issue.”
97 Hence, immigration policies were seen as “an important vehicle for 
addressing it [terrorism], particularly to ensure better application of law enforcement 
and intelligence”.
98 Consequently, the post 9/11 discourse strengthened the nexus 
between migration and terrorism and legitimated “politics of exception” at the national 
as well as EU level. 
In this context, Tony Blair stated in the House of Commons, that the anti-terrorist 
legislation will “increase our ability to exclude and remove those whom we suspect of 
terrorism and who are seeking to abuse our asylum procedures. It will widen the law 
on incitement to include religious hatred. […]”
99. This statement reflects as Huysmans 
points out, the link between immigration, otherness and terrorism.
100 Within this 
British discourse the institution of asylum as well as the adherence to the European 
human rights regime was questioned. For example the Conservative MP George 
Osborne said with regard of inclusion of the EHRC into British law, “I hope that we 
are aware that we are undermining the rights of our citizens because we have given so 
many rights to people, including suspected terrorists, who come to this country and 
claim asylum”
101. 
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At the same time, the European discourse continued to merge different social 
phenomenon into one continuum legitimating the continuous strengthening of border 
controls and the use of new surveillance technologies. The Laeken European Council 
of December 2001 declared that “better management of the Union’s external border 
controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and the trafficking  
of human beings”
102   
Thus, in the discourses at the national as well as European level the crossing of 
borders has become increasingly an issue of external and internal security, in which 
states having EU external borders or associated third countries were perceived as 
“battle line states (Frontstaaten)”.
103 This term illustrates the securitisation of the 
borders, including those crossing them.  
This security oriented discourse, underlining the us-them dichotomy as well as the 
potential threat of abuse of the asylum systems by potential terrorists, resonated well 
with the discourse in Germany. The next section will illustrate that despite the opening 
of the German discourse on immigration with the proposal for a comprehensive 
immigration system in 2000, the traditional exclusionary portrayal of foreigners as 
well as the security dominated debate on asylum regained momentum following the 
9/11 attacks.  
 
The German discourse: “Zuwanderungsgesetz” and European asylum procedures 
 
Parallel to the European-level discourse, in Germany the discourse shifted towards a 
more liberal perspective regarding economic immigration. While at the EU level it was 
the Commission taking the lead, at the German level it were the Greens and later the 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, as well as social and economic interest groups that 
were pushing for a comprehensive immigration policy including labour migration.  
When the coalition government of Greens and SPD took power in 1998, it became 
apparent that a change of orthodoxy was taking place in the German immigration 
debate. Even though the coalition treaty of 1998 did not explicitly call for an 
immigration policy, it was implicitly accepted as Germany was de facto an 
immigration country. Such a concession was “revolutionary” in a country that until 
then had claimed to be a “non-immigration country”.  
With the Green Card initiative for IT specialists in 2000, the government inspired a 
general debate on immigration among different interest groups as well as political 
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parties. Most importantly, the government set up an expert Commission involving 
different stakeholders (scientists, churches, economy and unions) – the so-called 
“Süssmuth Commission” – which tabled a report on the possibilities and chances for 
an immigration law. It was argued that immigration was necessary due to a rapidly 
declining population and an acute scarcity of labour, in particular of highly qualified 
workers. The discourse distinguished between on the one hand, those highly skilled 
and effortlessly “integrationable” (integrationsfähig) immigrants who were needed to 
secure the future economic growth and the sustainability of social security systems in 
Germany; and on the other hand all the other immigrants, including asylum seekers, 
who constituted an economic and cultural burden for the society.
104 The proclaimed 
aim was to encourage immigration into the labour market while preventing 
immigration into the “social systems”.
105  
In order to avoid an immigration that would overburden the German society, the 
Interior Minister, Otto Schily, demanded that an immigration policy was not to allow 
persons who were not in need of protection but were eager to exploit generous social 
protection systems, to stay in Germany.
106 In particular conservatives were calling for 
more restrictive measures to halt abuse of the asylum system, including the demand to 
abolish the constitutional right to asylum as set forth in article 16 Basic Law.
107 
Similar to the debate on the reform of the asylum law in 1992, it was once again 
claimed that Germany would not be able to uphold its liberal asylum policy in light of 
the harmonisation of standards in Europe. In the parliamentary debate on the Tampere 
Conclusions Jürgen Rüttgers of the CDU, for example put forward, “all our European 
partner countries are, as we know, thank God, liberal Western democracies and 
constitutional states. If however the predominant fraction of all asylum seekers 
arriving in Europe are still drawn to Germany, then there must be reasons. This is 
certainly related to our high benefits”
108 Manfred Kanther, former Secretary of the 
Interior (CDU) stressed that in particular Germany was still “suffering” due to the lack 
of security in Europe.
109 The majority of MPs of the SPD, the Greens, and the PDS 
(Socialists) framed the process of European integration as a means to establish an area 
of freedom, security and justice. Hence, the process of harmonisation should also 
entail a strengthening of the human rights dimension.
110 Interestingly, both, those 
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securitizing as well as those de-securitising asylum policy continued to draw a link at 
the national level between immigration, security and Europeanisation.  
With the attacks of 9/11, and rising unemployment, the issue of immigration and 
asylum was increasingly “securitised” by drawing a close linkage between asylum and 
security, similar to the discourse at the EU level and other European Member States, 
i.e. Great Britain.
111 Otto Schily thus argued that “[t]he security problem regarding 
immigration is not at all primarily a problem of workers’ immigration … but the 
question of which persons are coming to us under the heading of refugee 
protection.”
112 Secondly, the discourse raised concerns about the cultural threats posed 
to the German society by the development of “parallel societies” 
(Parallelgesellschaften) of Germans and Muslims, which would threaten the cultural 
homogeneity and would thus demolish European societies.
113 Thirdly, these Muslim 
communities would grant safe heaven to so-called “sleepers”. The “sleeper”, who was 
staying unrecognised in Germany, and who could turn at any time from being an 
inconspicuous student into a fanatic terrorist became a new “deterring enthrallment” 
(abschreckendes Faszinosum).
114 Consequently, any political measures encouraging 
migration were rejected while stricter asylum measures were defined as instruments of 
“self-protection”
115. The discourse on immigration thus, turned into one of internal 
security and “danger prevention” (Gefahrenabwehr), leading to an immigration law 
(2004) that primarily focused on instruments discouraging immigration and excluding 
immigrants.  
In sum, it may be argued that both the debate on the immigration law as well as the 
political discourse after 9/11 in Germany and at the EU level favoured a further restriction of 
asylum rights and hence reduced the policy options during the negotiations on the procedure 
directive. 
 
Negotiating the Asylum Procedure Directive: Exporting German standards? 
 
Since the Member States remained the dominant actors under the Amsterdam regime 
the negotiation process and the outcome were largely depending on the interests of the 
Member States. Hence, before tuning to the negotiations at the EU level the process of 
preference formation in Germany, in particular the debate on the first German 
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immigration law as well as the German election campaign of 2002 have to be taken 
into consideration. 
 
 
The German preference formation and institutional context: party cleavages, Bund-
Länder relations and the Basic Law 
 
Within the coalition government, Greens and Social Democrats had different views 
regarding labour migration as well as the harmonisation of EU standards. The Interior 
Minister, Otto Schilly, and most Social Democrats had long been sceptical with regard 
to a law allowing for legal immigration. The SPD was representing an electorate, 
which felt threatened by immigrants, particularly with regard to their economic 
situation. At the same time, a central demand of the Greens had always been the 
establishment of a modern immigration policy. As for asylum policy, there was a 
heated debate between Social Democrats and Greens on the need for a broader refugee 
definition including non-state and gender-related persecution. These different positions 
were fostered during the election campaign in 2002 as both governing parties had to 
serve the interests of different voter groups.
116 Moreover, the CDU continued to 
oppose any compromise and was “populously” using the issue of immigration as an 
election theme, arguing that the government would use the negotiations at the EU level 
to circumvent domestic opposition against a liberal immigration law and to 
predetermine the substance at the EU level, resulting in an unrestricted immigration 
and an abolition of the safe third country concept.
117 The CDU opposition explicitly 
linked the negotiations on procedural law at the EU level with the domestic discussion 
on an immigration law, with a view to increase the pressure on the government in the 
domestic arena. As the political parties were not able to reach a compromise on the 
immigration law prior to the elections of 2002 it was clear that the government would 
not be able to seriously engage in negotiations at the EU level until after the election 
and the passing of the domestic immigration bill.  
With a view to the EU harmonisation process, a “coalition” of CDU and SPD were 
in favour of a “transfer” of German standards to the EU level. The CDU feared that the 
harmonisation process would limit the German capacity to regulate refugee flows 
gained through the “Asylkompromiss”, especially the safe third country concept. Both 
SPD and CDU viewed the compatibility of European standards with the German 
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asylum law of 1993 to be essential to the German interests.
118 Since the asylum law 
reforms of 1993 the numbers of asylum seekers had fallen by 76% by 1998 compared 
to 1993 figures.
119 As the CDU and the SPD were attributing this success to the 
implementation of a restrictive safe third country rule, they agreed that any derogation 
from this rule would lead again to an increase in asylum seekers and thus to societal 
instabilities.
120 The Greens argued against a simple transfer of the German minimum 
standards without however, questioning the already established German asylum 
procedures (safe third country concept).
121 
Considering that the Länder share competences with the Bund in the area of asylum 
and immigration policy, the Bund has to take the opinions and decisions by the Länder 
into account, when negotiating at the EU level (see Art. 23 Basic Law). A 
representative of the Bundesrat is also present throughout the negotiation process in 
order to represent the Länder position. As the Länder and communities had also 
benefited from the declining number of asylum applications, the Bundesrat resisted 
any EU agreement that would lead to higher protection standards in Germany. The 
Länder agreed that common European minimum standards should aim at providing 
protection, while at the same time limiting the abuse of asylum procedures by 
economic or other immigrants.
122 To this end they asked the government, to counter 
the Commission’s proposal which did not include a provision allowing for the general 
designation of a safe third country nor a possibility for border officials to refuse the 
entry of an asylum seeker coming from a safe transit country.
123 At the same time the 
Länder had also a prominent role in the securitisation of migration.
124 The Bundesrat 
for example tabled its own proposals regarding the fight against terrorism focusing on 
immigration and asylum measures. The prime minister of Baden-Würtemberg 
demanded in this regard that “internal security must become a main aspect of all law 
dealing with foreigners and asylum”
125 This security-oriented move was also reflected 
in the subsequent negotiations between Bundesregierung and Bundesrat in the 
Vermittlungsausschuss (conciliation committee). At this point of time, there was a 
CDU/CSU majority in the Bundesrat, providing the Conservative opposition with a 
strong negotiating position, and demanding the government to make far reaching 
concessions to the Länder as well as the CDU/CSU, in particular with regard to the 
                                                 
118   Süddeutsche Zeitung 2003. 
119   Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1998. 
120   Geis 2004b. 
121   Käppner 2001. 
122   Deutscher Bundesrat 2001. 
123   Deutscher Bundesrat 2002. 
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inclusion of security measures. In the negotiations the Länder, in particular Bavarian 
interior minister Beckstein made clear that any concession at the European level 
especially concerning the “Asylkompromiss” would cost the government in the 
negotiations at the national level (Interview-3, Brussels, 2007).  
Since the “Asylkompromiss” of 1993, the safe third country rule is set forth in 
Article 16a (2) of the Basic Law. Thus, a change of the third country concept due to 
the harmonisation process at the EU level could entail a constitutional change. Such a 
reform of the Basic Law, however, would bear high costs at the national level, as it 
would demand a two-third majority in the Bundestag as well as the affirmation by the 
Bundesrat. Moreover, the case law of Constitutional Court sets forth that the 
constitutional principles as established by the Basic Law were not negotiable. 
Consequently, the German government had to veto any agreement at the EU level that 
would alter the provisions of Article 16a Basic Law.
126 The Basic Law was therefore, 
also a barrier for change and thus it limited the negotiation position of a German 
government.  
In sum, it may be argued, that there was a general consensus among Social 
Democrats and Conservatives as well as between Bund and Länder  that the 
achievements of the Asylkompromis”, in particular the safe third country concept, were 
not to be impaired by the European integration process.  
 
The negotiations at EU level: intergovernmental bargaining under unanimity and two-
level games (institutional context/set-up) 
 
After the Treaty of Amsterdam the Commission took a leading role in initiating 
directives in the area of asylum. In 2000 it tabled its first proposal for a directive on 
common asylum procedures. Aware of the fact that the unanimity rule in the Council 
would not allow for a far reaching harmonisation of standards, the Commission took a 
two step approach: first, minimum standards which would hardly interfere with 
national rules were to be adopted and second, a process of genuine harmonisation was 
to be commenced.
127 The safe third country rule proposed by the Commission was 
based on an individual assessment, not allowing for the automatic return of an 
applicant at the border.
128  
                                                                                                                                                         
125 Cited in Diez 2006, 16. 
126   Deutscher Bundestag 2003b, 25-26. 
127   European Commission 2000a. 
128   Ibid.  
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The negotiations in the Council on the directive proceeded cumbersomely. The 
notion of asylum policy touched the heart of state sovereignty, entailing great public 
sentiments and “strong national principles and views.”
129 It was also the first attempt at 
the European level to harmonise procedural law, demanding an approximation of 
administrative rules and procedures which are strongly embedded in national traditions 
and peculiarities. At the same time, the implementation of procedural matters will be 
more easily controllable for applicants as well as the EU body responsible for the 
oversight of the implementation of the directive. Hence Member States´ room of 
manoeuvre with regard to the implementation is limited.
130 Moreover, the unanimity 
rule in the Council enabled Member States to block any policy that was incompatible 
with their own laws and perspectives. All Member States were eager to preserve their 
asylum standards in order to avoid adaptational “costs” and to preserve well 
established national instruments to deal with increased migratory pressures.
131 Member 
States were thus merely agreeing on the general aim of a harmonisation process: To 
ensure “efficiency” and “rapidity” of the examination procedures
132 and to establish a 
safe third country concept which would prevent asylum shopping
133. Disagreement 
however, prevailed until 2004 with regard to instruments, including among others the 
notion of safe third country.
134  
The institutional structure of the Amsterdam Treaty, most notable the unanimity 
rule, permitted the Member States to play two-level games, and hence to uphold 
specific domestic procedures. Throughout, the negotiations several important Member 
States, including Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands, and Austria were 
reforming their national legislations.
135 As a result, the respective positions of the 
States were shifting, which made the negotiations particularly difficult.
136  
During the negotiations on the procedure directive, the German government’s aim 
was two-folded: first, to establish relative high procedural standards, in particular 
concerning the appeals; second, to have its specific rule as set forth in the 
Asylkompromiss, most importantly, the concept of safe third country and safe country 
of origin recognised at the EU level. With regard to upholding the safe third country 
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concept the German government had considerable scope for playing two-level games. 
It could plausibly maintain during the negotiations that its capacity to compromise was 
very limited due to constraints at the domestic level – most importantly the ongoing 
negotiations on the immigration bill as well as the applicable constitutional law.
137 
With regard to the immigration bill, the German delegation communicated from the 
start of the negotiations onwards that it would only be able to present a unitary 
position and make concessions after a compromise on the immigration bill was 
reached between the Bund and Länder in the conciliation committee. Although the 
asylum procedure directive only marginally touched the immigration bill in substance, 
there was an implicit link between the two, as the CDU/CSU opposition was prepared 
to use any concessions made by the German government in relation to the 
Asylkompromiss (safe third country rule) at the EU level, to demand a trade off in the 
negotiations between Bund and Länder on the immigration bill (Interview-3, Brussels, 
2007). Here, the opposition indicated that any changes to the Asylkompromiss would 
seriously threaten, for example any compromise on the question of including non-state 
and gender-specific persecution in national law, as foreseen by the EU Qualification 
Directive.
138 Second, the government could credibly refer to constitutional constraints. 
Any agreement, which did not allow Germany to keep its version of the safe third 
country concept, would require a change of the Grundgesetz, so the argument went. 
And this was to be avoided given that a 2/3 majority was necessary was such as 
change. Third, the CDU-dominated Bundesrat would not have supported any 
European concept derogating from the German standards. Hence, the German 
government could credibly refer to domestic constraints making it politically 
imperative to have the German safe third country concept recognised at the European 
level. 
The German delegation came in with its own proposal on a safe third country rule 
rather late in the negotiations process, in October 2003. It proposed a rule that would 
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allow the refusal of refugees at the border when entering from a “designated” third 
country – a super safe third country rule, modelled along Article 16 GG.
139 During 
2004/05 there was a heavy debate among Member States in particular on the 
possibility of a common list of safe countries. This idea was first informally elaborated 
at the political level during a G5 meeting in 2003, when Germany presented its version 
of the safe third country concept as an effective measure to prevent mass influx of 
refugees (Interview-1, Interview-2, Brussels, 2007). A formal proposal for a common 
list was then made by Austria, Italy and Luxembourg in 2003 in order to avoid 
secondary movement
140, and especially France
141 regarded a common list as the best 
means to constraint German influence (Interview-2, Brussels, 2007). While Germany 
was not opposed to a common list, it made a reservation to ensure that it could keep its 
national list until the Council would decide on a common list.
142 In the end, the 
Council agreed on a concept that allowed Germany to retain its domestic regime and at 
the same time foresaw the establishment of a common list by the Council. It can thus 
be argued that Germany successfully exported its safe third country concept. The 
German government managed to get “its” safe third country concept accepted by other 
Member States and the Commission due to the unanimity rule and because it could 
play a credible two-level game by pointing to severe domestic constraints which 
further strengthened its negotiating position in Brussels. 
The super safe country rule as laid down in the directive meant another 
“externalisation” of migratory pressure to neighbouring countries.
143 At the same time, 
it questions the non-refoulement principle and thus the international refugee regime. 
The European asylum regime hence moved further away from the liberal post-War 
refugee regime.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
All in all, our framework made up of (1) the discourse, (2) the institutional set-
up/context, and (3) exogenous and functional pressures has proven robust. As regards 
the Europeanisation of German asylum policy, we have argued that the developments 
at the European level influenced and helped to legitimise the reform of the German 
Basic Law, despite the absence of clear-cut legal requirements stemming from the 
Dublin or Schengen Conventions. Functional and exogenous pressure provided the 
(material) basis for the predominating policy discourse and the two-level games played 
by actors. The perception and articulation of the free movement of persons rationale 
and the influx of asylum-seekers and refugees grew towards the peak of domestic 
reform discussions in 1992/93. In terms of the institutional set-up/context, in the early 
to mid-1990s the increased influence of the interior ministry also made itself felt. 
Moreover, two-level games contributed to a change in the domestic discourse, as 
Conservative policy-makers skilfully argued that a ratification and functioning of 
European initiatives required a change of Article 16 GG, thus redefining the issue as 
one about European integration, which brought the Social Democrats and Liberals on 
board. The securitarian and restrictive policy frame adopted at the European level 
resonated well with the policy discourse at the domestic level, which facilitated the 
redefinition of the “problem” as a European and not a domestic one. 
In our analysis of the negotiations concerning the Asylum Procedure Directive we 
argued that Germany sought to – and succeeded in – exporting its safe third country 
concept to the European level, a process we have termed the “Germanisation” of EU 
asylum policy. The German government’s specification of the “super safe third 
country concept” at the EU level has been explained as follows: first, in terms of the 
institutional set-up/context, facilitated by the unanimity requirement, Germany 
exploited the opportunity to strengthen its bargaining position by playing the two-level 
game. Pointing to the domestic level was effective given the substantiality of the 
domestic constraints, such as the need to avoid a constitutional change (given the 2/3 
majority requirement), the parallel domestic negotiations of the Zuwanderungsgesetz, 
and the role of the CDU/CSU dominated Bundesrat in domestic policy-making on 
asylum. Second, the evolving policy discourse at the European and domestic level(s) 
additionally contributed to this outcome. The further securitised discourse in Germany 
increased the domestic constraints for EU level negotiations (thus also positively 
affecting the possibility to play credible two-level games). In addition, the German 
version of the safe third country concept fitted into, and resonated well with, the  
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securitised policy discourse across Europe. This discourse, in turn, can be largely 
attributed to the evolution of exogenous and functional factors like the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11, right-wing election victories. These exogenous and functional factors also 
contributed to the domestic constraints that the German government faced in its EU 
level negotiations concerning the procedure directive (and hence also to its negotiating 
power in terms of two-level games). 
What insights does this paper generate concerning the Europeanisation research 
agenda? First, Europeanisation processes may not necessarily be instigated by EU-
level pressures, exogenous from the domestic level.
144 In other words, Europeanisation 
may not be an external process, driven by EU-level (legal) requirements, but may be 
domestically framed and constructed (e.g. through the discourse and two-level games), 
as (particularly) section 3 has indicated. Second, and closely related, our analysis 
confirms the tendency – which is often articulated, but less often put into practise in 
terms of actual research – that we need to go beyond one-directional, top-down 
accounts of first-generation Europeanisation research. Third, and building on the 
previous point, our paper has shown that Europeanisation processes may, in fact, 
increase the scope for manoeuvre of national governments
145 that can thus retain 
considerable control over the process. Fourth, and following from the above, our paper 
– and particularly the parallel negotiation on the Zuwanderungsgesetz and the Asylum 
Procedure Directive – suggests that Europeanisation is not only characterised by both 
‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’, but that a strict separation between the two categories 
is ultimately difficult to sustain, given frequent feedback processes and interaction 
between the two levels.  
Despite the constant development of the EU asylum regime, this paper has indicated 
that Member governments can retain considerable control over asylum policy. 
Through the institutional set-up/context, the discourse as well as exogenous and 
functional pressures, (the) German government(s) managed to frame and influence 
internal and EU negotiations such that most of their preferences were downloaded 
from the EU level and uploaded from the domestic level. It remains to be seen to what 
extent the advent of qualified majority voting (and the exclusive right of initiative for 
the Commission) may affect Member State control over (EU) asylum policy in the 
future. 
 
                                                 
144   Cf. Knill 2001, Buller 2006. 
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